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"The process whereby the eventual result of some scheme 1 on the 
ground' bears little relation to the thoughts of the man at the top 
is so familiar as hardly to need illustration.n(l) 
Introduction 
The Enterprise Zone (EZ) idea is closely connected with the 
efforts of - the "man at the top" - Sir Geoffrey Howe. We document 
profound changes in the nature of his policy as it moves toward im-
plementation in the usual policy-making processes of consultation, 
negotiation and accommodation. What is of particular interest is 
that Sir Geoffrey was singularly well aware of the problems assoc-
iated with policy innovation - and the tendency for "administrative 
difficulties" to emerge. Howe aimed to overcome, by firm political 
direction, obstructions in implementation but, in practice even a 
"non-negotiable" policy turns out to be negotiated. That enter-
prise zones have been created suggests that this is an example of 
an Opposition intention being translated into action, but so con-
siderable have been the changes in the detail of the scheme, that 
this can scarcely be viewed as the implementation of the Howe in-
tention. The following discussion focuses particularly on the 
proposed Clydebank EZ. The Clydebank example indicates the trans-
formation of the policy- although in some ways the Clydebank EZ 
represents the most considerable deviation from the Howe ideal. 
The History of an Idea 






















servative Party, the notion of the Enterprise Zone is widely attri-
buted to the planner Peter Hall - usually considered to be a 
socialist. Hall, impressed by the economic vitality of the 
areas of Hong Kong and Singapore after a trip to the Far East, 
suggested that government might induce the regeneration of derelict
inner-city areas in Britain by the encouragement of selective immi-
gration of entrepreneurial Armenians, Hong Kong Chinese, Bengalis 
and Ugandan Asians. Citing the historical examples of ghetto Hugue-
nots, Jews and Irish, Hall recalled the injection of 'a rich new 
entrepreneurial strain' and the success of these 'new capitalists•.
Why shouldn't government see this and build on it? 
Rather than the injection of financial resources, which he 
averred would merely maintain local bureaucracies and lead to un-
useable factories for large scale industry Hall maintained, 
"Better by far to develop a policy of identifying 
the sources of spontaneous regeneration. That would 
take a brave statesman indeed.n(2) 
The Howe Version - Isle of Dogs 
The Shadow Chancellor, Sir Geoffrey Howe, assumed the role of 
'brave statesman' at a Bow Group meeting in the Waterman's 
Arms, Isle of Dogs in June 1978. He presented the EZ concept as a 
personal idea which was part of his free enterprise philosophy. 
Hall proposal had been first made in February 1977 and elaborated 
at the Royal Town Planning Institute Conference in Chester. 
Hall in fact had raised this issue as far back as 1969 
was then advocating the idea of Non-plan(
3
) and is still a devotee 
of a radical solution to the problems of urban decay and 
er's mortmain.( 4 ) Howe in fact claimed to be less radical than Hall,
who had outlined a 'Freeport' or •crown colony' idea. This was seen 
by Hall as an 'extremely drastic last-ditch solution' which 
tried 'only on a very small scale' probably in an area that was 
'largely abandoned and denuded of people'. An indication of its 
cal nature was Hall's observation that UK passports would still 
valid. Howe presented his own ideas as more modest proposals to 
measured against the more dramatic yardstick of the •crown colony' 
idea. The Howe idea was radical enough by conventional standards. 
He suggested that in four or five places for a guaranteed number of
years: 
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1. Planning control of any detailed kind would cease to apply. 
Any building that complied with very basic anti-pollution, 
health and safety standards and was not over a stated maximum 
height (and did not threaten to frighten the horses) would be 
possible. Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs) and Offioe 
Development Permits (ODPs) would not be required. 
2. Public authorities would be required to sell off land. New 
developments would be free from rent control. 
3. There would be no development land tax and perhaps exemp-
tion from rates in whole or in part. The concessions were to 
apply only to new firms. 
4. Businesses would be given a guarantee that tax law would not 
be changed to their disadvantage. No government grants or sub-
sidies would be payable. 
5. Price control, pay policy and perhaps legislation such as 
Employment Protection would not apply. 
Howe believed it would be necessary to establish a new model 
authority with some of the qualities of a new town to administer 
each of the zones. Sir Geoffrey argued that the scheme ~ be 
managed through the existing framework of local government, but 
that many of the problems arose from the process of securing a 
common view between overlapping or adjacent local authorities. He 
stated that Enterprise Zones would ~ be considered as regional 
policy ..•••. "Rather the idea would be to set up test market areas 
or laboratories in which to enable fresh policies to prime the pump 
of prosperity and to establish their potential for doing so else-
where.~" 
Howe acknowledged that the idea required more analysis but he 
specifically warned of the GREY MEN "whose job it is to consider 
the 'administrative difficulties of any new idea •.• (and) ••. to 
start manufacturing the small print that cou,ld stop the initiative 
in its tracks.'"But he invoked the spirit of Winston Churchill who 
in 1940 was told that the idea of compensation for war damage was 
quite unthinkable. "Churchill had not been prepared to take 'no' 
for an answer and the outlines of an entirely beneficient scheme 
was drawn up within three weeks."( 5 ) 
Although the EZ idea had only reached outline development 









allow us to examine how much compromise was necessary to allow it 
to be put into practice. 
Developments in Office 
The most important difference between the Hall proposal of 
1977 and the Howe proposal of 1978 was that Hall did not become 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1979. Hall perhaps floated the idea 
but it was Howe's strategic position which placed it firmly on the 
agenda. The EZ idea re-emerged in the Budget Statement of March 
1980. It would be unrealistic to present the EZ as more than a 
minor theme in that Budget but the Chancellor introduced EZs as 
"an idea which is intended to pioneer a new, and more adventurous, 
approach to the question of industrial and commercial renewal."(
6
) 
Firmly apportioning responsibility for non-resolution of ur-
ban or inner-city problems between planners, administrators and 
tax bureaucrats he prefaced his proposals with: 
"There are some parts of our economy, most notably in 
the older urban areas, where more and more public 
authority involvement seems to have led to less and 
less fruitful activity. The planning process has all 
too often allowed, even caused, whole areas at the 
heart of some of our most populous cities to be laid 
to waste for years, even decades. Even when plans are 
finally made the public purse is often unable to pro-
vide the funds, or the expertise to match the planner's 
aspirations. And when private initiative might have 
been ready to stir, it has generally been stifled by 
rules and regulations and by a tax system which pays 
no regard to these special problems.n(7) 
The proposals were then set out with minimal elaboration. The pro-
vision for capital allowance and relief from Development Land 
were included in the Finance (No 2} Bill 1980 and the rating, 
ing and designation procedures were introduced as 
amendment to the Local Government, Planning and Land (LG, P&L) 
(No 2). The detail was set out in Schedule 25 of the Bill (Now 
Sl79 and Schedule 32 of the LG, P&L Act 1980). Provision for 
Industrial Training Board exemption for· establishments in EZs was 
eluded in the Employment and Training Bill (No.49) passed June 1 
The Committee stage of the LG, P&L Bill produced Opposition 
expressions of concern regarding local authority freedoms in conn-
ection with the EZ proposal. The Opposition seemed unequal or un-
enthusiastic in presenting the planning argument and there seemed 
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to be a tacit acceptance of the Howe/Treasury line that, "We had 
tried everything else so why not this?" Members, after token re-
sistance regarding the principle, seemed more concerned for their 
constituencies - particularly, and understandably, those in inner-
city areas. 
The DOE Version 
As Parliament dealt with the LG, P&L Bill in May/June 1980, 
the DOE taking over as lead Department for the Treasury circulated 
a policy proposal document to some 75 organisations. The document 
stated that the Government would welcome comments on the proposals 
from Local Authority Associations, from organisations and indivi-
duals with an interest in the subject. The 'policy proposal' was 
sent directly to Local Authorities in eight specific areas. This 
was a 'first list for consideration' for the 3 - 4 EZs in England 
and one each in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland 
the document went to Clydebank District Council, Glasgow District 
Council, Renfrew District Council and Strathclyde Regional Coun-




) expanded (and in part changed) the 
Isle of Dogs version. It specified that the zones would generally 
not be more than 500 acres. The sites were to be allocated to 
areas with problems of economic or physical decay. The scheme was 
presented as an experiment in the encouragement of industrial and 
commercial activity, by the removal of fiscal burdens and the re-
moval of administrative controls. While it was again claimed that 
the proposal had nothing to do with regional, inner-city or dere-
lict land policy, the fact that it was concentrated in areas of 
economic or physical decay makes the distinction a fine one. In an 
important change, it indicated that the sites chosen would con-
tinue to benefit from whatever aid was normally available and that 
the proposed benefits would apply to existing firms as well as the 
'new' enterprise. 
The time limit of ten years was specified. Exemption from 
DLT was confirmed. The capital allowance for corporation tax and 
income tax was set at 100% and was to apply to industrial and 
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commercial and industrial property was also promised; the loss of 
revenue to be reimbursed by 100% specific grants from the Exchequer.
The deregulation of planning procedures (de-planning) was inter-
preted to mean the production of a plan specifying acceptable class
es of activity and thereafter 'blanket permission' for anything in 
the acceptable use categories. But it was indicated that certain 
matters would be 'reserved' and that these together with any pro-
posed use falling outwith those prescribed in the plan would requir
Local Planning Authority permission. 
As it was appreciated by Ministers that the de-bureaucrat-
isation dimension of the package had been eroded by the dropping 
of the Health and Safety relaxations and the drift away from Howe's 
original "anything legal permitted" idea, three minor additions 
were made to consciously 'beef up' the Isle of Dogs package. Firms 
were to be relieved of their responsibilities to comply with In-
dustrial Training Board requirements, requests for statistical 
information were to be reduced to a minimum, and applications for 
customs warehousing and inward processing relief were to be given 
priority. It was expected that the Enterprise Zones would come in-
to operation at the end of 1980. 
EZs Become Part of Inner-City Policy 
The period between the Conservatives'election victory in May 
1979 and the publication of the policy proposals was a period of 
internal Whitehall discussion. In the Treasury chaired meetings, 
'departments' such as the Scottish Office, DOE, Department of Em-
ployment spoke for their particular interests but the interests 
were not directly consulted. For example, it was predictable that 
the Department of Employment, engaged in controversial enough po-
licy change over picketing was unhappy at further aggravating the 
unions with the proposal that in areas of Britain workers would 
lack employment protection and even health and safety protection. 
There was group power through 'anticipated reaction'. 
In this period the Treasury was in the unusual role of being 
a spending department. The sums involved were admittedly small 
(the capital allowance provision was costed at £20M and the 'rates 
holiday' at £10M- 15M per annum). However departments such as the 
Scottish Office regarded this as a small financial bonus which for 
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once did not have to be extracted under pressure from the Treasury. 
It may be significant that the capital allowance provisions involve 
the non-collection rather than spending of revenue. The Treasury 
apparently finds it more ~ttractive to forego revenue than to spend 
it. Thus there tends to be a bias towards this kind of solution in 
policy making. 
The Treasury was in the position of attempting to overcome 
the scepticism of other departments and as concessions were made in 
the 'selling' of the idea, the package became more 'a policy like 
the others' and less an experiment in non-intervention. The DOE pro-
posal conceded that some of the measures to be applied would be dis-
criminatory and hence not necessarily suitable for wider applicatio~ 
The EZs became more and more an offer that industry was unlikely to 
refuse. The financial benefits o£ being outwith the rates and tax 
systems were not o££set by the withdrawal of grant aid. The areas 
had become islands o£ positive discrimination rather than o£ non~ 
intervention. Scottish O££ice staff £or example have interpreted 
the scheme as a further layer of assistance for Clydebank. 
A definite change in emphasis appeared in the package. Origin-
ally in Howe's proposal the problem was one o£ planning blight and 
decay, the 'mortmain' or dead hand for which the remedy was de-
planning. As a negotiated package emerged however the planning free-
dom was increasingly qualified and the advantages o£ the zones were 
to be seen as primarily fiscal. This drift in policy was of course 
quite against Treasury intentions. In late 1979 the debate was about 
'planning free zones' rather than Enterprise Zones - but now the 
de-planning argument is less prominent. This is hardly surprising. 
The track records of local authorities in areas such as Clydebank, 
inner city areas of dereliction, are characterised by an almost in-
decent haste, a bending over backwards to accommodate industry and 
commerce of any size in their desire to create employment. Scottish 
O££ice research indicates that 95% of planning applications are pro-
cessed within the statutory two month period. One Clydebank par-
ticipant has argued - "the idea of planning control stifling enter-
prise would be ludicrous in Clydebank. There have been virtually 
no private enterprise proposals to stifle •...• Singers and the 
collapsed shipbuilding industries were already virtually planning 
























rights under the Planning Acts". (
9
) 
A £urther requirement o£ the 'selling' o£ the idea was the 
development o£ 'proportionality'. Given that the proposal is now 
positive discrimination rather than experiment, it has been politic-
ally necessary to distribute the zones throughout the usual region~ 
planning areas. Zones have been allocated to all the Regional Plann-
ing Areas apart £rom the South West and East Anglia. 
It is our major claim that in the process o£ negotiation, dep-
artments have e££ectively replaced the Chancellor's concerns and 
priorities with their own. Departments have extracted what they want 
£rom the policy. On the legitimate basis o£ their experience, de-
partmental 1 lines 1 are developed as to what is or is not practical-
what is or is not required. The changes made in the EZ package have 
taken the measure away £rom the 1 set the people £ree 1 model o£ in-
dustrial growth to an interventionist belie£ that positive assist-
ance is required. It is now necessary to view the EZ as part o£ a 
package o£ incentives to industry rather than an experiment in non-
intervention. 
Selecting Clydebank 
The decision to locate the zone in Clydebank rather than else-
where in Scotland - or even elsewhere on Clydeside - again re£lects 
the temptation to satis£y two needs with one policy. The DOE policy 
proposal went out to Ren£rew District Council as well as to Glasgow 
and Clydebank because the initial thinking within the SDD appears 
to have been to select Braehead just upstream on the 1Ren£rewshire
1 
side o£ the river £rom the eventual location. But as the Clydebank 
Working Party was in operation at this time - mainly under the aegis 
o£ the SEPD - in response to the Singer closure in 1979 with the 
loss o£ 3000 jobs, the decision was made to allocate the zone_ to 
Clydebank. This is one reason £or the trans£er o£ responsibility 
the Scottish O££ice £rom SDD (Development) to SEPD (Economic 
C1ydebank was chosen because that happened to be the major 
problem on the agenda at that time. Had the Singer £actory survived 
a £urther couple o£ yea~s when unemployment was generally much 
worse, the Clydebank area would not have received the high level 
attention it did. Clydebank was also chosen because the SEPD has 
viewed the area as possessing real potential. It is viewed as pre-
senting an opportunity to create success in an area which is con-
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sidered to be less derelict and devoid o£ skills than is popularly 
conceived(lO) and which could in turn spark o££ success in other 
less well placed areas. 
In £act the so called Clydebank Enterprise Zone comprises two 
legally distinct schemes. The larger one is under the auspices o£ 
Clydebank District Council but a smaller area is technically the 
responsibility o£ Glasgow District Council. Two separate processes 
have been necessary to produce two separate EZs - which have been 
presented, to simpli£y promotion o£ the area, as the Clydebank En-
terprise Zone. When consulted about the DOE/SO policy proposal, 
Glasgow District CounCil argued £or a 'string o£ pearls' type o£ 
application o£ the idea in which the zone consist o£ a large number 
o£ suitable key sites, not necessarily adjacent. This proposal was 
rejected because the original vision had been about ~ parcel o£ 
land. However the Glasgow proposal would have meant that all the 
land in the zone was £ree £or new development and suitable £or new 
development - this is not the case in Clydebank. 
Following the precedent o£ the Glengarnock Task Force the SDA 
had been 'persuaded' to set up a £urther Task Force in Clydebank. 
Clydebank could be nothing other than number one priority. However 
the important thing to note here is that the Task Force was set up 
be£ore there was any intimation that Clydebank was to become an 
Enterprise Zone. The Task Force, however, has assumed day to day 
management o£ the zone. 
The Task Force's own attitude can be seen £rom the £allowing 
extract £rom their in£ormation handouts to £ootloose industry: 
"The boost provided £or Clydebank by it being Scotland's 
Enterprise Zone is only one element in a much broader 
£ramework o£ incentives which exist £or all sectors o£ 
industry." 
and they go on to say: 
"No one is claiming that Enterprise Zone status is in 
11 itsel£ su££icient to accelerate economic development."( ) 
Again, the Enterprise Zone is presented as one o£ a set o£ interven-
tionist devices. 
Policy De£lections 
The budget package on EZs, which re£lected internal/Whitehall 
amendments to the Howe initiative, has been £urther amended in more 


































An important change in the power balance in these detailed negotia-
tions occurred once the Prime Minister announced the proposed loca-
tions of the first seven zones in July 1980. Until that point the 
Government was in a position to resist Local Authority pressures and 
could adopt a 'take it or leave it attitude'. Bilston was dropped 
from the early 'short list' for this reason. But once the Government 
had announced the location of the intended zones, it would have 
been politically embarrassing not to proceed. The major amendments 
in the scheme in response to outside representations (often abetted 
by sympathetic departments) were : 
1. Qualifications to "acceptable use" 
Restrictions even within the categories of acceptable use have 
been made. The major amendment has concerned hypermarkets. A hyper-
market of around 100,000 sq. ft. would be eligible for rates relief 
of about £3M per year and hence EZs are very attractive to such 
ventures. In Scotland there is a further bias towards non-industrial 
development - since all industrial concerns have 50% rate relief, 
the rates holiday is disproportionately attractive to retailing. 
Hypermarkets are, however, a long standing bete noir of the local 
government planning community and in response to general pressures, 
including representation from existing hypermarket developers there 
was obtained from government a general ceiling of 65,000 sq. ft. on 
unrestricted development. At most of the proposed zones the local 
authorities have been unhappy with a limit set as high as 65,000 
and have sought much lower figures. Clydebank was in favour of 
total reservation of such matters. In this case their concern is 
obvious from locational factors. The proposed EZ impinges on three 
sides upon their own, newly developed £11M town centre - a joint 
undertaking of the local authority, the Co-operative Insurance 
Society and a private company, Neale House Developments. The un-
derstandable concern was that an EZ in its proposed boundary would 
mean that within easy walking distance of 
tition could set up enjoying the benefits of tax concessions and a 
rates holiday. Clydebank have managed to secure the right to 
for specific consideration all food or clothing proposals irres-
pective of size and any non-food or clothing proposals in excess 
of 400 sq. metres gross. In other words, the only retail develop-
ments for which planning permission will not be required are those 
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involving non-food or non-clothing shops less than 400 sq. metres 
gross. 
2. Warehousing/whisky Bonding 
In Scotland, having regard to the incidence of whisky bonding, 
the Scottish Office and the local councils were not unsurprisingly 
concerned with unlimited warehousing development. In such development 
the rates element represents a relatively high percentage of costs, 
there being little plant and few employees. A rates holiday of ten 
years is therefore again particularly attractive for such ventures. 
Given that the major priority of the Scottish Office in this area 
and at this time was to 'mop up unemployment', the prospect of an 
Enterprise Zone dedicated to warehousing with its limited conse-
quences in terms of job creation is less than appealing. The 
Associations of the warehousing industry have also been pushing 
for the interests of their members who face fresh competition from 
warehouses within the zones but the Treasury ministers have set 
their faces against further general concessions on warehousing. 
The promise of a review has been extracted should there in practice 
be a problem. Clydebank, however, have been allowed to exempt whisky 
bonding from their "acceptable use" categories and hence have re-
tained a capacity to limit bonding in the EZ. It appears likely 
that the safety argument of the fire risk involved in a large area 
of bonds was more influential with Ministers in Whitehall than the 
employment implications. 
3. "Double Benefit"(l2 ) 
Although the idea was announced by Sir Geoffrey with a dis-
claimer that it was no part of inner-city or Regional Policy, in op-
erationalising the scheme great attention has been paid to location. 
The zones have been restricted to disadvantaged areas. This is cer-
tainly not a necessary condition or characteristic of the original 
idea. In pure terms any 500 acre parcel of land with arbitrarily 
drawn boundaries would constitute a test of the theory, but by con-
centrating in urban problem areas two policy objectives are achieved 
simultaneously. There is a claimed test of the theory, but as the 
discriminatory policy seems unlikely to do anything but good it is 
as well to do good where it is most needed. 
A further twist to the zone choice however is noted by one 
commentator,(l
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of zones by putting money on horses half way down the course." Thus 
absolute no hope areas are avoided and safer bets are chosen such as 
the fringe sites at Dudley or Corby or as in Clydebank where an exis~
ing intensive interventionist programme is underway. The Government, 
anxious that the 'experiment' should succeed, looked to those areas 
where there is already a higher level of planning or intervention. 
4. Distributive Pressures 
The policy process has been a good example of distributive 
politics. As Lowi(l4 ) predicts this type of policy- where in the 
short term the indulged and the deprived, the loser and the reci-
pient, need never come into confrontation, the pressures are to add 
to the list of recipients. This takes the edge over the debate on 
what 'ought' to happen. There is a process of dilution of positive 
discrimination. The number of zones has grown from 5-6 to eleven. 
Hood(lS) describes the political logic of 'spreading benefits wide-
ly'. Similar dilution of positive discrimination occurred with the 
US 'Model Cities' programme and, nearer home, with Regional Aid 
policy. 
Local Authorities (Labour controlled) find themselves in some-
what of an ideological dilemma. On the one hand they do not wish to 
hand the Chancellor and the Conservative Government a propaganda 
victory on the merits of capitalism, on the other there seems to be 
'something for nothing' on offer. It is of no great surprise that 
Labour controlled authorities have appeared willing to accept any 
benefit available and that there has been considerable overbidding. 
In Scotland, the Scottish Office received bids from about half a 
dozen authorities- even though a Clydeside area was the almost 
certain choice. Dundee, Fort William, Kyle and Carrick, Wigtonshire 
and the Isle of Eigg all put forward a case. The last named was the 
most speculative. Dundee and Fort William were able to base their 
case on unemployment needs, Kyle and Carrick put forward Prestwick 
as the core of their scheme - fitting in with the 'freeport' notion.
Wigtonshire ingeniously argued that if the policy was experimental 
a rural location should be included in the list. So sought after 
is EZ status that an authority such as Swindon has been advertising 
itself using headlines such as "Enterprise Zone ..•• Commercial 
Paradise, Swindon Enterprise Zone Extraordinary.rr(l6) What is most 
extraordinary is that Swindon is not an Enterprise Zone. Imitation 
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is the sincerest form of flattery. 
Se "Creep" 
As well as a tendency to growth in number of sites, there is a 
tendency to spread of area. Precise boundaries are necessary given 
the important financial benefits but this leads to apparent arbitra-
riness. For example it appears that at one point the proposed line 
at Clydebank went between two opposite corner site pubs. Was it the 
intention of the proposal that one public house should sell beer at 
three pence a pint cheaper than the local competition? In remedy-
ing these anomalies the zones inevitably spread outwards. As the 
zones get larger the ultimate cost to the Treasury is likely to in-
crease and hence the "game" has been between the local authority 
seeking to maximise areas (and hence advantage) and the Treasury 
seeking to limit their (still open ended) commitment. The average 
size of zone now appears nearer 700 than 500 acres - e.g. Salford/ 
Trafford (780 acres), Dudley (540 acres), Swansea (735 acres), 
Clydebank (593 acres). The effect on industry marginally outwith the 
zones has been one of the major lines of criticism of the EZs. For 
example UIE and Goodyear (also then) at Clydebank have suggested 
that they would be suffering unfair competition if they were not 
included. Boundary "creep" permits the buying off of vocal criticism. 
At some point the "creep" of the boundaries and the numbers 
would attract the attention of the EEC. In 1979 the Treasury ob-
tained EEC agreement that it would ignore the unfair competition 
aspect of the proposals but that too widespread use would mean 
that this would be reappraised. The number at that time was set at 
about ten. If Clydebank DC had succeeded in having the zone extend-
ed to include the John Brown and UIE yards which are internation-
ally recognised names engaged in international tendering, then the 
'unfair competition' angle might have risen again. 
While logically the larger the area designated the greater the 
potential benefit to the local authority involved this does not 
mean that all the pressures for expansion have come from the Dis-
trict Council. It was the SDD in May 1980 which indicated to the 
District Council that the zone should be larger than the 80 or so 
acres of the original Singer site. While the District Council has 
sought to include the Shopping Centre, the shipyards and the 
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Ministry o£ De£ence land at Old Kilpatrick* it has sought to exclude 
the Turners Asbestos site next to the river because o£ the pollu-
tion inheritance. Clydebank 1 s original submission also deliberately 
excluded main road £rontages because a) these areas might become 
chaotic in planning £ree zones, b) they mainly catered £or the motor 
trade and those in the zone would have an un£air advantage and c) 
they were virtually £ully developed. 
The exclusion o£ the Old Kilpatrick site stemmed £rom the £act 
that its inclusion in the zone would have resulted in an area much 
larger than the 500 acre norm although the reluctance o£ Strath-
clyde Regional Council to consider the provision o£ in£rastructure 
was also important. The exclusion o£ UIE,John Brown's and the 
shopping centre can be put down to the £act that these concessions 
would have been very expensive in terms o£ rateable value relie£. 
Whitehall Ministers were reluctant to concede too much to existing 
£irms; the concept was aimed at helping new companies. It was only 
the practical problem o£ distinguishing between 'new' companies 
and those companies which would re-£orm themselves to obtain bene-
£its which stopped the legislation £rom reserving relie£ to new 
companies in the zones. 
6. Clydebank detailed concessions 
In Clydebank there was a cooling o£ enthusiasm in late 1980 on 
the part o£ the Council in their negotiations with the Scottish 
O££ice and there would appear to be two reasons £or this. Firstly 
there is the tactical stance, where the authority has attempted 
to maximise advantages and minimise disadvantages. This partly re-
volves round detailed questions o£ boundary alignment and partly 
questions o£ planning and building control, use zonings and reser-
ved matters. By appearing reluctant to compromise and develop a 
'£all back• position, the Council was adopting a predictable nego-
tiating tactic. A second reason £or a lack in local authority en-
* It is interesting to note that within the Treasury it has lately 
been mooted that an exclusive allocation o£ zones to surplus MOD 
land throughout the country would have obviated the need to 'horse 
trade' with local authorities and other interests and made £or an 
easier passage £or the Treasury. 
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thusiasm perhaps has its roots in ideological antipathy. It would 
appear that Labour Councillors were under party pressure to cease 
their 'collaboration' with the Conservative Government. 
Planning permission will be granted £or development within the 
Enterprise Zone in accordance with the £allowing. As can be seen the 
permitted development concession has been swamped by detailed re-
strictions: 
1. Permitted Development 
A general planning permission is granted £or all development 
normally requiring permission (subject to the reservations and 
conditions below). 
2. Reservations 
The £allowing require planning permission: 
erection o£ or use o£ a building as a shop or use o£ land as an 
open air sales area any part o£ which is used £or the sale o£ £ood 
or clothing. 
erection or use o£ a building as a shop with a gross £loor 
area in excess o£ 400 sq. metres or use o£ land with a gross area 
in excess o£ 400 sq. metres as an open sales area. 
erection or use o£ a building as a warehouse £or the storage 
o£ excisable spirits 
industrial development or use within the Special Industrial 
Groups (Use Classes V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX). 
any development requiring licensing under the Nuclear Installa-
tions Act 1965 
any development o£ £actories, magazines or stores which re-
quires licensing under the Explosives Act 1875 
advertisements requiring express consent under the Town and Coun-
try Planning (Control o£ Advertisements)(Scotland)Regulations 1961 
amusement arcades 
any development within 7.5 metres o£ the centre line o£ the 
main out£all sewer 
any development or change o£ use above the ground £loor o£ a 
tenemen~ building 
within a prescribed area (sub-zone A) erection or use o£ build-
ings or use o£ land £or general industrial purposes (Use Class IV) 









within a prescribed area (sub-zone B) (land contaminated by 
asbestos waste) the full requirements for planning permission under 
the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 apply 
Standard Conditions 
no structure may rise above 15 metres above ground level with-
out clearance from the Civil Aviation Authority 
connections to public roads, turning areas, parking and provi-
sion for parking and unloading to be to the satisfaction of the Re-
gional Highway Authority. (l7 ) 
The planning permission given does not relieve the applicant 
from obtaining necessary statutory permissions under Building, 
Health, Safety, Sewerage, Water, Fire, Pollution and Licensing con-
trols and consultations would be required with public utilities 
undertakers: water, gas, electritity and telephones. 
The draft Glasgow version of the EZ document (with Strath-
clyde Region's road details) runs to some 40 pages and the Clyde-
bank document 30 pages. The documents point out that even proposals 
not requiring planning permission need to comply with legislation 
such as the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, the Building 
(Scotland) Acts 1959 & 1970, Clean Air Acts 1956 & 1968, Factories 
Act 1961 etc. In all more than 60 Acts are specified in the Glasgow 
document. In other words any concern interested in developing with-
in an Enterprise Zone is likely to require local authority advice 
and assistance before engaging in 'permitted development'. 
Group Positions 
The policy is short on group or party friends. Predictably the 
NEC of the Labour Party, while poting that any inner-city authority 
would be tempted by 'any initiative or gimmick', opposed the scheme. 
The STUC General Council considered that the proposal would lead to 
'industrial shanty towns'. The Labour Party very much view the 
scheme as an undesirable form of intervention. " a new form of 
industrial subsidy to be paid by the tax payer without any 
control or conditions, the ultimate beneficiary will not be the 
community at large but private capital."(l8 ) But there is ambiva-
lence in Labour's position. The Labour MP R.B. Cant noted that his 
support of EZs made him a lonely voice on the Opposition benches, 
but he claimed that his colleagues look over their shoulders and 
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 think of constituency interests and they begin to qualify their to-
tal opposition. (l
9
) The CBI in their submission also perceive EZs 
as interventionist. Prefacing their comments with a general endorse-
ment of the principle and a statement of support for government po-
licies about the right economic environment for business, they includ< 
a plea for less government intervention in business and declare 
against measures which entail discrimination between firms. They 
recognise that in the EZs differential trading conditions will be 
created and they do not like the idea of undue distortion of compe-
tition or the mere removal of industrial activity from one place to 
another. As a monitored experiment the scheme was welcomed, as it 
was hoped that success in the zones would lead to a general relaxa-
tion of controls and the general provision of incentives. 
It would appear that business groups generally are in principle 
in favour of EZs, but they too weigh advantages and disadvantages. 
The Association of Independent Businesses was quoted in the Committee 
Stage of the Local Government, Planning and Land Bill as having 
twelve separate reservations on the proposal. ( 20) The tenor of spe-
cific comments for a group is likely to be set by companies outside 
the zone which have real interests to protect - rather than those 
unaffected companies with only, to a greater or lesser extent, a 
commitment to an abstract ideal. 
The CBI believe that EZs will be of only limited value to 
smaller firms - which rather contradicts the original intentions 
of the Enterprise Zone idea. They do not believe that firms will be 
overly keen to invest in EZs in the early stages and they are con-
cerned that the current climate of depression in business activity 
will adversely affect the value of the proposal. 
The CBI statement made the point, vigorously taken up by the 
Scottish CBI, that there was a major issue of infrastructure provi-
sion. 
It was considered essential that an early decision be taken on 
the provision of funds for the development of an appropriate infra-
structure within and close to Enterprise Zones including a social 
infrastructure. The Scottish submission went on to say: 
"It should be appreciated that the establishment of 
new small businesses is unlikely to happen solely 
by designation of a location as an Enterprise Zone. 










stem directly from the supporting administrative, 
secretarial and advisory services provided by BSC 
(Industry) Ltd. This has created an inter-dependent 
community trading within itself and the conditions set 
for an Enterprise Zone favour similar growth provided 
a similar strong supportive service is available.n(2l) 
This CBI (Scotland) point subscribes to the interventionist concept 
of how new business should be developed and not the laissez-faire 
model. Experience in Eire suggests that this 'hand-holding' of new 
business is needed. Padraic White, the Chairman of the successful 
Irish development authority has suggested, 
"Our experience is that the entrepreneur needs more 
encouragement than the classical free enterprise 
Friedman philosophy would contemplate.n(22) 
Despite the rhetoric of the market British business appears unwill-
ing or unable to take risks unless they are underpinned by a state 
safety net. 
The hypermarket and superstore groups favoured the Zones but 
this presumably followed from the fact that this was an expanding 
area of activity. Had hypermarkets been well established and dev-
eloped the interest of operators would have been against EZs. 
Builders are interested in promoting housing development but this 
has been resisted from the outset. 
The Bureaucracy of de-Bureaucratisation 
The implementation of the simple 'little Hong Kong' idea has 
involved considerable practical difficulties. As Sir Geoffrey fore-
saw in 1978 the simple principles have run into 'administrative 
difficulties'. 
The 'consultative' procedure whereby the Chancellor's hobby 
horse has been implemented in some form or another is interesting 
(and one suspects typical). There has occurred a series of bi-
monthly meetings with the core interested departments. Some of the 
negotiations have been bi-lateral - e.g. the Scottish Office/Treas-
ury meetings to settle the boundary of the Clydebank Zone, but 
the bulk of the discussion has been multi-lateral. The policy 
making process has necessarily involved a plethora of departments, 
local authorities, agencies and interests. 
The administrative geography of the Zone is complex. While 
most of the Zone is in Clydebank,part of it is in Glasgow thus 
both Clydebank DC and Glasgow DC are party to the negotiations with 
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the Scottish Office. Within the Scottish Office the original respon-
sibility lay with the SDD but was transferred to the SEPD: both 
departments have an interest. This complex inter-organisational 
network is more akin to what Howe wanted to remove than what he 
wanted to create. Howe had a scornful aside at previous tirban 
policy where the same amount of money was shuffled from "one 
fashionably-named urban programme to another." He cited with dis-
taste the DOE's description of Birmingham's Inner Area project 
"a multi-authority, interdepartmental steering committee under the 
chairmanship of the Department of Industry, the County or the Dis-
trict as appropriate." He quoted a 'New Statesman' author who had 
argued that "the complex inter-relationships between the various 
local authorities and other agencies involved have created an in-
ertia." The de-bureaucratisation of the inner-city has certainly 
not been advanced by the EZs; they too involve complex relation-
ships. At its official unveiling in March 1980 the intention was to 
have the first EZ operational by December 1980, the slippage has 
been such that the Clydebank Zone is not expected to be designated 
until August 1981. 
Strathclyde Region were unhappy at their lack of formal invol-
vement in the zone designation process and 'inspired' Lord Ross in 
an unsuccessful Parliamentary attempt to get formal consultation 
rights. The Region was concerned that while they had statutory 
responsibilities for matters such as roads and water they were left 
out of the main discussions. The Region objected to the assumption 
that their investment priorities should be determined by District 
Council/Scottish Office decisions. It was also expected that at the 
end of the ten year 'experiment' pressures would exist to bring the 
standards in the Enterprise Zone up to those in the rest of the Re-
gion. Glasgow DC attempted to arrange a meeting between themselves, 
the Region and Clydebank DC to agree a local authority 1 view 1 on 
the zone but the other authorities preferred bi-lateral relations 
with New St. Andrews House. 
Only after agreement on the boundaries,the reserved matters, 
the zoning policies and the conditions does the Secretary of State 
send out the formal letter inviting the two Local Authorities in-
volved to prepare their separate submissions for his approval. 





informal clearance from the various public bodies involved before 
the formal invitation is issued. The Scottish Office has been in 
touch with the SDA, Strathclyde Region, the Health and Safety Ex-
ecutive. This prior agreement with interested bodies is an attempt 
to save time (and embarrassment?) in the formal consultative pro-
cess. Prior agreement with the District Councils is needed because 
the Secretary of State's final power is to designate or refuse to 
designate the schemes put forward by Clydebank and Glasgow: he 
cannot amend the proposals at the later formal stage. Accordingly 
there is a great emphasis placed on "arranging" what the schemes 
will include. The 'informal agreements' concluded between the 
Scottish Office and the Local Authorities are put in an exchange 
of letters and only then is the formal invitation extended. In the 
case of the Clydebank Zone the formal invitations from the Scottish 
Office containing the details outlined above was extended on 20 
February 1981. 
Once the two local authorities involved had produced their 
separate 'draft' schemes, the planning conventions require "a 
reasonable period for consultation with the statutory interests." 
Scottish Office legal advice and interpretation indicated that this 
meant at least 28 days. It was hoped that the 'Kissinger shuttle 
diplomacy' would mean approval by return of post and hence shorten 
the consultative process by some 3-4 weeks. It would appear that 
this is not to be the case. Strathclyde Region produced a lengthy 
document for annexation to the brief zone proposals and introduced 
a major surprise by seeking to reserve or safeguard a new road line. 
The Civil Aviation Authority comments were late and it eventually 
asked for an amendment to incorporate a runway public safety area 
which had already been rescinded. The Health and Safety Executive 
apparently did not realise that pipelines are control~ed by the 
Department of Energy not the Local Authorities but the local office 
was able to resolve the difficulty. The 'shuttle diplomacy' did not 
appear to lead to any time saving. 
After the consultation with statutory bodies stage, the public 
consultation stage follows. Again following planning precedent this 
is of 6 weeks duration. Should there be no delay caused by objec-
tions to the scheme (grounds are restricted, with no public inquiry 
provision) the local authority can adopt the plan and forward it to 
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the Secretary of State. There it must lie for six weeks with the 
possibility of challenge for improper procedure in the Court of 
Session. At the end of this period the Secretary of State can make 
a Designation Order (or reject the scheme/the two separate schemes). 
These Orders are then subject to negative resolution procedure in 
the House of Commons and this entails another minimum 21 days. Thus 
the minimum period of consultation 
concerned and no public objections 
assuming the agreement of all 
is about 19 weeks. 
The agreement reached between the two authorities and the Scott-
ish Office casts some doubt on the value or validity of subsequent 
procedures. Some participants will no doubt, with much justification, 
feel that the consultation is purely a mechanical and cosmetic de-
vice. The Swansea Enterprise Zone was the first to reach formal in-
vitation stage and legal advice caused the Welsh Office to amend 
their draft letter of invitation to propose a scheme from "in acc-
ordance with the exchange of letters" to "taking into account the 
exchange of letters." This 'subtle' touch hardly affects the sub-
stance of the issue. 
Conclusion 
The following table indicates that Sir Geoffrey has not got 
what he wanted but ironically he has perhaps got something which 
suits his pragmatic propaganda purposes better than his exercise of 
de-regulation and de-control. What the Zones are not are experiments 
in the value of the unfettered free market in job generation and 
profit. The design of the schemes is non-experimental.* There is not 
a range of different types of site and conditions being compared. 
This is not necessarily a disadvantage from the Chancellor's point 
of view. The nature of the scheme has been altered more and more to 
the extent that it now constitutes an unrelieved financial blessing 
for companies locating in the areas: presumably jobs will arrive 
in the zones (relocated if not new jobs). 
* This is likely to present some considerable difficulty to the 
firms of consultants appointed ostensibly to monitor the EZs for 
an initial three year period. (Thereafter monitoring will be carr-
ied out in-house by the departments concerned.) 
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Ill 
HOWE'S ORIGINAL ISLE OF DOGS 
PROPOSAL ( 197 8 ) 
1. Detailed planning control 
would cease to apply; any 
building which complied with 
very basic anti-pollution, 
health and safety standard-s 
and not over a maximum stated 
height would be permitted. In-
dustrial Development Certifica-
tes and Office Development 
Permits would not be required. 
2. The Community Land Act would 
be put into reverse. Publicly 
owned land would be required, 
within a specified time, to be 
sold to private bidders by 
auction. New development would 
be free from rent control. 
3. Entrepreneurs who moved in 
to this land would be exempt 
from Development Land Tax and 
perhaps from rates in whole or 
in part. 
4. Businesses would be guaran-
teed that tax laws would not be 
changed to their disadvantage. 
An undertaking from the Crown 
would be given to the effect 
that they would not be liable 
to future nationalisation. 
5. No government grants or sub-
sidies would be payable to any 
enterprise within the area. 
6. Legal obligations or threats 
would not operate, e.g. price 
control or pay policy and some 
or all of the Employment Pro-
tection Act. 
7. All this to be guaranteed 
for a stated and substantial 
number of years 
Other features to be implemented: 
MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN 
ENTERPRISE ZONES (1981} 
1. Plan produced showing approved 
use classes,zonings,conditions 
and limitations - blanket permiss-
ions. 'Reserved matters' - exist-
ing D.C.to apply e.g. Hypermarkets,
all proposals over 65000 sq. ft. 
reserved,and lower ceilings for 
particular areas. Developments to 
meet Health and Safety standards, 
building control and height limit-
ations. IDCs and ODP~ limited app-
lication, being phased out gener-
ally. Little specific advantage 
to EZs. 
2. Community Land Act repealed 
1980 - again no specific EZ ben-
efit. No mention of enforced sale 
of land and no mention of rent 
control exclusion. 
3. DLT exemption but DLT limita-
tion exists outwith the zones. 
Rates relief introduced. Also 100% 
capital allowance for income and 
corporation tax purposes for comm-
ercial and industrial buildings. 
4. No mention of this - no signi-
ficance under Parliamentary Sover-
eignty. 
5. Grants and subsidies retained. 
6. No mention of exemption from 
any price or pay policy (because 
not generally operative) but also 
no exemption from Employment Pro-
tection Act. 
7. To run for a ten year period. 
Establishments in EZs Speedier handling of Government requests 
for statistical in-
formation reduced to 
a minimum (but data 
for monitoring the ex-
periment probably re-
quired. 
would be excluded from 
the requirements of 
the Industrial Train-
ing Boards (may be re-
moved generally) 





In many zones some form of 'special force' or agency exists al-
ready to help create or regenerate the local economy. It may be an 
Industrial Development Officer or team offering little more than a 
site finding service and advice on grants and loans, in others the 
'hand holding' exercise may be on a grander scale, e.g. BSC Industry 
Ltd. operating in Swansea, Hartlepool, Corby and the SDA, through 
its Task Force, in Clydebank. 
It is interesting to list, apart from the EZ boost, what is 
actually, on offer in the Clydebank Zone. SDA promotional litera-
ture points to the following advantages: 
Special Development Area Status 
Regional Development Grant 22% on Buildings, plant and 
machinery 
Selective Financial Assistance-additional aid to employment 
creating projects 
office and service industry grant aid 
in plant training assistance 
European Investment Bank loans 
SDA support 
loans for buildings, plant, equipment and working capital 
Equity participation capital injection 
financial guarantees 
business advice on accounting, financing and marketing. 
Sites and buildings 
advance factory units sale or rent 
purpose built units sale or rent 
sites for purchase 
refurbished premises 
The Task Force 
- a flexible, non-bureaucratic team 
The Conservative Party will be able to draw the conclusion that 
minimalised planning and industrial de-regulation encourages devel-
opment - even though the financial benefits of positive discrimina-
tion or the advice of interventionist agencies might be the under-
lying cause of the investment. The pressures on the Chancellor have 
forced him to weight his own 'experiment' firmly in the direction 
of his desired conclusions. 
The EZs have had a more immediate benefit than that of long 
term public relations. Even if the policy never has any impact what-
ever on the problems of underinvestment, of inRer-city decay and 
economic stagnation it has allowed the Governm>nt to demonstrate 
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IIi: 
its concern regarding unemployment. As a placebo policy it can be 
judged a success. Even more specifically the announcement of the 
location of the zones has been useful ammunition in debates on the 
economy. It has been suggested(
23
) that Howe's announcement in 1980 
was delayed a ~onth to be on the 'good news' in the Budget. The 
Prime Minister announced the first seven zones in a censure debate 
on 29 July 1980. It is obviously useful in such circumstances to 
be able to claim;· "We are creating an opportunity unequalled in 
modern times". (
24
) In a Commons debate on unemployment in 02tober 
(28/10/80) the Chancellor announced the location of probable sites 
for the East Midlands (Corby) and the West Midlands (Dudley)~ 
Again the announcement was the cue for a positive sounding passage 
in his speech. The final two zones of the round were announced in 
yet another debate on the economy in January 1981 - Kirby and Hartle
pool. In the March Budget, 1981, Enterprise Zones were described as 
a "major new initiative which had stimulated intense interest among 
investors ... "The Enterprise Zones are very useful 'good news' 
stories as is perhaps indicated by the high number of newspaper 
features which have accompanied this modest financial investment 
by the Government. 
The EZ co~cept has moved from in essence being an experiment 
in deplanning to a package of incentives to industry to locate in a 
particular area. It has do~e so despite the manifest intentio~s of 
the ChancelloL It remains a politically attractive kind of public 
relations development -while the departments with industrial urban 
responsibilities seem to have successfully transformed the device 
into their standard routines. The interventionist policy style has 
prevailed. 
An example of a similar process of policy translation is that 
observed in the development of the EPA (Educational Priority Area) 
idea. Banting notes that the idea was essentially social-science 
theory and that it ran into sharp conflict with the institutional 
structure" and in the end the proposal was fundamentally re-
moulded to fit the existing contours of administrative and political
life. The resulting policy turned out to be a pale reflection of the
original idea."(
25
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